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TITLE VII: TREATMENT OF
SENIORITY SYSTEMS
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER*
Seniority systems are a commonplace aspect of American
labor relations.1 In enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,2 Congress provided a special exemption for seniority
systems. The prevalence of seniority provisions in many work-
places makes the interpretation of the seniority exemption
very important to both those who support the protection of
seniority systems and those who support the broadest possible
application of the proscriptions of Title VII.
The Supreme Court has recently addressed a number of
important questions raised by the seniority exemption. The
basic framework established by the Court includes: an at-
tempt to define the concept of "seniority systems," the stan-
dard by which the legality of seniority systems is to be mea-
sured, and the availability of seniority as part of the "make
whole" relief granted to a discriminatee. This article will raise
some of the questions which are presented by the seniority
exemption and review the courts' answers to these questions.
I. THE CONCEPT OF SENIORrrY
Seniority entails a system of employment preference based
on length of service. s As an employee's length of service
increases, his employment benefits and rights will improve.
Seniority may play a role in determining an employee's job
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1. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHrs, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS AND CIVIL
RIGHTS, No. 1, pp. 23-24 (February, 1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
3. Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforcement of Seniority Rights,
75 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1534 (1961).
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security, priorities for promotion, shift preference, receipt of
fringe benefits and many other job-related matters.
The two basic types of seniority are competitive seniority
and benefit seniority.4 Competitive seniority determines pri-
orities for job security, promotion, transfer, prerogative in
scheduling, training opportunities and "entitlement to other
scarce benefits among competing employees." 5 Benefit senior-
ity involves entitlement to certain types of fringe benefits
without regard to the status of other employees.
Labor has been the strongest proponent of seniority." A se-
niority system provides objectivity to employment relations.
An employer's use of discretion is limited by the operation of
a seniority system. Three labor-oriented advantages may be
readily found in a seniority system: 1) employees become to
some degree independent of the employer's subjective deter-
minations regarding who is to be laid off, promoted, etc.; 2)
the union is guided by a seniority system regarding whose in-
terests it is to defend as between employees; 3) an employee is
able to predict his future employment status by reference to
the seniority system.7
Some employer-oriented advantages may be found in the
use of seniority. First, employers may be able to retain their
most senior and valuable employees through the use of a se-
niority system which provides incentives. Secondly, some se-
niority systems will assure the employer that employees ready
for promotion are experienced individuals.8
While the great majority of major collective bargaining
agreements contain seniority provisions, seniority is not con-
sidered an inherent aspect of employment relations.9 A senior-
ity system must be established through collective bargaining,
or as the result of a management decision. Nevertheless, the
wide use of the seniority concept in labor relations accentu-
ates its importance in Title VII jurisprudence.
4. Franks v. Bowman Transpbrtation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976).
5. Id. at 780-81. (Burger, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6. Fisher, Seniority is Healthy, 27 LAB. L.J. 497, 498 (1976).
7. Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforcement of Seniority Rights,
75 HARv. L. REV. 1532 (1961).
8. Id.
9. Jones, Title VII, Seniority, and the Supreme Court: Clarification or Retreat,
26 KAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1977-78).
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Seniority systems may take various forms. An employee's
seniority may be measured by his length of service with an
employer or at a plant, in a department or division, in a job,
or in a line of progression. 10 Seniority may be a determinative
factor in employment preference or it may just be one
consideration.
In summary, seniority involves an employment preference
system based on length of service. Seniority systems may vary
in form and application. Because of their prevalence in Ameri-
can labor relations, seniority systems have a great impact on
the distribution of employment benefits throughout the
United States.
II. TITLE VII LAW
This article analyzes the Title VII exemption for seniority
systems. In order to fully understand the impact of such an
exemption it is necessary to review the general principles of
Title VII law. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, and
sex. Chief Justice Burger has stated that "[t]he objective of
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees.""' Discrimination is defined in the broadest
sense throughout Title VII.'2
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company," the Supreme Court
determined the scope of the prohibition on discrimination in
employment under Title VII. Griggs defined discrimination in
terms of effect rather than motive or purpose. The Court
noted that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, or even neutral in terms of intent, can-
not be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
10. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HAV. L. REv.
1598, 1602 (1969).
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
12. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1598, 1602 (1969).
13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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prior discriminatory employment practices . . . . If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is pro-
hibited.1 4 This case provided plaintiffs in Title VII litigation
with a strong weapon since the subjective motive of the defen-
dant would not be essential to the presentation of a prima
facie case of discrimination.
Since plaintiffs in Title VII litigation could'rely on proof of
discriminatory consequences to prove a prima facie case under
the disparate impact test, the use of statistics became very
important. The Court, in Hazelwood School District v.
United States,"5 noted that statistics can be an important
source of proof in employment discrimination cases, since
"absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that non-
discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work
force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic com-
position of the population in the community from which em-
ployees are hired.""'
A plaintiff's case under the disparate impact rule consists
basically of establishing discriminatory effects of an employ-
ment practice. Discriminatory purpose and intent is unneces-
sary to establish a cause under Title VII. This general back-
ground of Title VII will aid in understanding the impact the
seniority exemption has on Title VII law.
III. SENIORITY AND SECTION 703(h)
Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ap-
ply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona
fide seniority system, or a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production or employees who work
in different locations, provided that such differences are not
14. Id. at 430-31.
15. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); see also
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
16. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977), (quoting
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977)).
[Vol. 64:79
TITLE VII SENIORITY SYSTEMS
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.17
The development of the interpretation of this section has
proved one of the more complicated problems in Title VII
jurisprudence. Title VII does not provide a definition of the
term seniority. The treatment of seniority systems has also
had subsumed within it the problem of the retroactive appli-
cation of Title VII, the standard for joint union-management
liability, and the treatment of relief as well as the treatment
of seniority systems.
The answer to four questions will explain or at least reveal
many of the problems that have emerged from the treatment
of seniority systems:
1. Is a seniority system, which in its operation has a dis-
proportionate impact on women and/or minorities or which
perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination, unlawful
under Title VII?
2. Are victims of post-Act discrimination entitled to re-
ceive seniority as a part of a court-ordered remedy?
3. What types of employment policies or practices are
within the notion of a "seniority system"?
4. How may the bona fide nature of a seniority system be
attacked?
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
703(h)
The best way to understand the answers ultimately given
to the four questions asked above is to trace the treatment of
section 703(h) from its beginning in some of the earliest Title
VII law. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.18 is the seminal case.
Before Title VII was enacted and for six months after its ef-
fective date, the employer maintained a formally segregated
job structure with the lower paying jobs concentrated in the
black departments. The collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided for competitive seniority by department. Transfer
among departments was historically prohibited and later re-
stricted. Those employees who transferred started at the bot-
tom of the seniority list in the new department and forfeited
17. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1970).
18. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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their old seniority. Blacks, hired before Title VII became ef-
fective, were concentrated in the formerly all black depart-
ments and were hindered in transferring because that entailed
the loss of seniority. Declaring that "Congress did not intend
to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into dis-
criminatory patterns that existed before the act,"' 9 the dis-
trict court found the operation of the departmental seniority
system to be present discrimination. "The differences that
originated before the act are maintained now. The act does
not condone present differences that are the result of [an] in-
tention to discriminate before the effective date of the
act. .. 2o
The Quarles rule extended the Griggs effects or conse-
quences doctrine to challenges involving the application of a
seniority system. A seniority system which perpetuated the ef-
fects of a pre-Act discriminatory practice would not be consid-
ered bona fide. The Fifth Circuit adopted the Quarles test in
Local 189, Papermakers v. United States," a case involving a
formal system of race segregation in a paper plant. To satisfy
the notion that Title VII was prospective only, the court dis-
tinguished pre-Act job applicants, who were the victims of
hiring discrimination, from incumbent employees who were
the present victims of the operation of the line-of-progression
seniority system that restricted their transfer opportunities.
"Fictional" or constructive seniority would not be granted to
victims of discrimination who had never worked for the em-
ployer because that would give retroactive effect to Title
VII.22 However, incumbent black workers were entitled to
credit for time worked in black jobs to give them equal status
with the time worked by whites in white jobs. The remedy
was to order the use of plant-wide seniority as a basis for bid-
ding on future job openings. This so-called "rightful place"
doctrine, 2 based on plant-wide or company-wide seniority,
had the inevitable effect of pushing employers and unions to
adopt plant-wide seniority. The "present effects" test of dis-
19. Id. at 516.
20. Id. at 517-18.
21. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1969).
22. Id. at 995.
23. Title VII, Seniority, Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1260, 1268 (1967).
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crimination became the universal method the courts used to
treat seniority issues under Title VII. Under it, the answer
was yes to question 1; that is, employees or groups which were
victims of pre-Act employment discrimination which is per-
petuated because of the operation of a seniority system do
have a Title VII claim for relief. As will be seen, however, the
Supreme Court took a different view of the matter.
The first Supreme Court decision to deal with seniority
under Title VII was Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.
2 4
The case, as it reached the Court, did not involve a challenge
to the operation of a seniority system but instead dealt with
the claim for a make-whole remedy, including a grant of com-
petitive seniority, to victims of post-Act hiring discrimination.
Although it ordered that these victims of hiring discrimina-
tion be hired as jobs opened up, the Fifth Circuit had denied
them competitive seniority back to the date they would have
been hired but for the employer's hiring discrimination. 25 Be-
cause the discrimination occurred after the effective date of
Title VII, there was no question of retroactive application. In-
stead, the Fifth Circuit looked to the seniority rights of in-
cumbent white employees and held that Congress, in enacting
section 703(h), meant to insulate the incumbent employees'
seniority from dilution or diminution that would result from
the grant of constructive seniority to victims of hiring
discrimination.
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Fifth Circuit's
distinction between fictional seniority and time actually
worked, and its reliance on section 703(h). The Court found
that section 703(h) was not involved since it defines which se-
niority systems are discriminatory but does not "expressly
purport to qualify or proscribe relief otherwise appropriate
under the remedial provisions of Title VII."26 Given that a
principal purpose of Title VII was "to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimi-
nation," 2' the Court held that identifiable victims of post-Act
hiring discrimination were presumptively entitled to a grant
24. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
25. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. 424 U.S. at 758.
27. Id. at 163, (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975))
(presumption of back pay).
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of remedial seniority: "Without an award of seniority dating
from the time when he was discriminatorily refused employ-
ment, an individual [victim of hiring discrimination] will
never obtain his rightful place in the hierarchy of senior-
ity. .. ,,2" Thus, the answer to question 2 - whether a vic-
tim of post-Act hiring discrimination is entitled to a remedial
grant of seniority - is yes.
In 1977 the Supreme Court took its second seniority case,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,2 9
and used it to fundamentally alter the jurisprudence of Title
VII, especially as concerns the treatment of seniority. Team-
sters, like Franks, was a truck driver case concerning over-
the-road or line-driver jobs. The Fifth Circuit held that the
use of separate seniority for city and line-driver units oper-
ated to lock minority drivers, concentrated in the city unit be-
cause of hiring and assignment discrimination, out of line-
driver jobs since transfer required the forfeiture of seniority.
Because the employer and union created and maintained the
seniority system, they were found jointly liable under the pre-
sent effects of past discrimination standard. The relief pro-
vided that incumbent minority employees were entitled to use
company seniority to bid for line-driver jobs when openings
occurred even if their company seniority predated the effec-
tive date of Title VII.
The Court rejected the approach of the Fifth Circuit, find-
ing that victims of pre-Act discrimination could not challenge
that discrimination. "[A]n otherwise neutral, legitimate se-
niority system does not become unlawful under Title VII
simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination."30
Since the language of section 703(h) does not in any way bear
on the question of the prospective or retroactive application
of Title VII, the Court relied on the legislative history of Title
VII preceding the addition of section 703(h):
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus,
for example, if a business has been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when
28. Id. at 168.
29. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
30. Id. at 353-54.
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the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would
be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-discriminatory
basis. He would not be obliged - or indeed, permitted - to
fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for
future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them
special seniority rights at the expense of white workers hired
earlier.8 1
Thus, the Court rejected the Quarles and Local 189, Paper-
makers approach which held that seniority systems perpet-
uating pre-Act discrimination in effect cause new, post-Act
discrimination. Title VII, the Court held, has no effect on se-
niority systems even where, owing to pre-Act discrimination,
white males had more seniority than minority group members
and women. "[T]hat conclusion is inescapable even in a case,
such as this one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incum-
bent employees who accumulated seniority in other bargain-
ing units." 2 At least in regard to seniority systems, the Court
turned Quarles on its head: Congress did intend to freeze an
entire generation of employees into discriminatory patterns
that existed before Title VII was enacted. The answer to
question 1, which since Quarles and Local 189, Papermakers
had been yes, was now no.
The Court thus confronted a challenge to the operation of
a seniority system by victims of hiring discrimination that oc-
curred after Title VII's effective date. In dealing with the
challenge, the Court appeared first to abrogate entirely the
present effects test of discrimination and, second, to restrict
the application of disparate impact discrimination in cases
challenging seniority systems. The present effects test of dis-
crimination as applied to departmental or job seniority sys-
tems favored plant-wide seniority since the concentration of
minority workers in the less desirable jobs was reinforced
through the operation of departmental seniority. The Court
rejected the notion that Title VII required such a result:
In addition there is no reason to suppose that Congress in-
tended in 1964 to extend less protection to legitimate de-
31. Id. at 350-51, (quoting Interpretive Memorandum of Senators Clark and Case,
110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964)) (emphasis added by Court). See also, 110 Cong. Rec.
7207, 7217 (1964).
32. 431 U.S. at 354.
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partmental seniority systems than to plant-wide seniority
systems. Then, as now, seniority was measured in a number
of ways, including length of time with the employer, in a
particular plant, in a department, in a job, or in a line of
progression .... The legislative history contains no sugges-
tion that any one system was preferred.3
That rather oblique rejection of the present effects of past
discrimination standard in Teamsters became more clear-cut
with the Court's decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans.3 4
In Evans plaintiff had been discharged under a policy struck
down as discriminatory in a separate action. When the policy
was rescinded, she reapplied and was rehired but was denied
her previously accumulated seniority. Because she had not
challenged her original discharge, and because the discrimina-
tory policy underlying her original discharge was no longer in
force, plaintiff had nothing to challenge as discriminatory ex-
cept the operation of the seniority system which carried into
the present the past effects of discrimination. That is, her ear-
lier discharge still had impact on her present employment op-
portunities since she had less seniority than she would have
had absent that earlier discrimination. Despite this present ef-
fect of past discrimination, the Court found that she had no
Title VII cause of action. Plaintiff "is correct in pointing out
that the seniority system gives present effect to a past act of
discrimination. But United was entitled to treat that past act
[her discharge] as lawful after [plaintiff] failed to file a charge
of discrimination within [the statutory time limit]."3 5
Evans and Teamsters indicate the demise of the present
effects test of discrimination. Teamsters also restricts the ap-
plication of the disparate impact doctrine. When women and
minorities are concentrated among the most recently hired
employees, a downturn will cause them to be disproportion-
ately laid off pursuant to a last-in, first-out seniority system.
The Court acknowledged that: "Were it not for § 703(h), the
seniority in this case would seem to fall under the Griggs ra-
tionale,"' but the section provides full immunity from such
33. Id. at 355, n.41.
34. 431 U.S. 653 (1977).
35. Id. at 558.
36. 431 U.S. at 349.
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analysis. Further, the Court found that no alteration of the
seniority system was needed to give a full remedy to all the
victims of post-Act hiring and assignment discrimination
under the Franks principle: "Post-Act discriminatees ...
may obtain full 'make whole' relief, including retroactive se-
niority [to the date they would have become line drivers but
for the company's discrimination] without attacking the legal-
ity of the seniority system as applied to them. 37
V. ATTACKING THE BONA FIDES OF A SENIORITY SYSTEM
UNDER Teamsters
The answers to the first two questions appear to be as fol-
lows: (1) Victims of pre-Act employment discrimination are
not entitled to a Title VII remedy where the effects of that
past discrimination continue into the present or where the
present operation of a seniority system has a disproportionate
impact on women and minority employees. (2) Victims of
post-Act discrimination are entitled to a grant of seniority as
a remedy measured from the time the initial discrimination
occurred.
It must, however, be noted that the operation of seniority
systems is not completely immunized from Title VII attack.
While acknowledging that "the routine application of a bona
fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title
VII,' 38 the Teamsters Court does allow an avenue of attack on
a seniority system itself. Even the victims of pre-Act discrimi-
nation can challenge a seniority system if it is not bona fide or
if differences in treatment pursuant to a seniority system are
the result of an intention to discriminate. The source for the
standard, specially applicable to seniority systems, is the lan-
guage of section 703(h): "To be sure, § 703(h) does not immu-
nize all seniority systems. It refers only to 'bona fide' systems,
and a proviso requires that any differences in treatment not
be 'the result of an intention to discriminate because of race
...or national origin.' "31 The Court uses this to save the de-
cision in Quarles by treating it as a case involving a seniority
system that was not bona fide:
37. Id. at 347.
38. Id. at 352.
39. Id. at 353.
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Insofar as the result in Quarles and in the cases that fol-
lowed it depended upon findings that the seniority systems
were themselves "racially discriminatory" or had their
"genesis in racial discrimination," 
. . . the decisions can be
viewed as resting upon the proposition that a seniority sys-
tem that perpetuates the effects of a pre-Act discrimination
cannot be bona fide if an intent to discriminate entered into
its very adoption.40
This test for attacking the bona fide nature of a seniority sys-
tem could be a powerful tool, since many of these systems
were originally adopted before Title VII was enacted and they
frequently formally segregated on the basis of race or gender.
However, the Court's treatment of the issue in Teamsters
seems to restrain the attack: the employer had been found
guilty of intentional discrimination 41 so it should have been
easy for the Court to conclude that at least one party to the
collective bargaining agreement that produced the seniority
system lacked good faith. Instead, the Court treated the bona
fide nature of the seniority system as an entirely separate is-
sue and found both union and employer free of liability.
The seniority system in this litigation is entirely bona fide.
It applies equally to all races and ethnic groups. To the ex-
tent that it "locks" employees into non-line-driver jobs, it
does so for all. The city drivers and servicemen who are dis-
couraged from transferring to line-driver jobs are not all Ne-
groes or Spanish-surnamed Americans; to the contrary, the
overwhelming majority are white. The placing of line drivers
in a separate bargaining unit from other employees is ra-
tional, in accord with the industry practice, and consistent
with NLRB precedents. It is conceded that the seniority sys-
tem did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, that it
was negotiated and has been maintained free from any ille-
gal purpose.42
While the city drivers were not all minority group mem-
bers, the employer was found guilty of intentional discrimina-
tion in the almost total exclusion of minority drivers from the
line-driver jobs. That exclusion could not have been main-
40. Id. at 346, n.28.
41. Id. at 336-43.
42. 431 U.S. at 356 (footnote omitted).
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tained by the employer through its hiring and initial assign-
ments alone. The seniority system was necessary to keep mi-
nority employees from freely transferring into the line-driver
unit. So, while the Court concluded that the union's conduct
in agreeing to and maintaining the system did not violate Ti-
tle VII, the union's agreement was necessary to keep minori-
ties out of the line-driver jobs. Unfortunately, the lower courts
did not focus on either company or union conduct in creating
the seniority system because of the ease with which joint lia-
bility could be found as to union and management under the
Quarles present effects of past discrimination standard. In
any event, given the summary fashion in which the Court
found no liability for union and management in Teamsters,
the standard may now have gone too far to the other extreme.
VI. BEYOND Teamsters
The two major questions concerning seniority systems that
remain after Teamsters are: first, what types of policies or
practices are within the notion of a seniority system?; second,
how can the bona fide nature of a seniority system be
attacked?
If the first question is answered broadly enough, a wide
range of employment decisions concerning job rights, from
transfer and promotion to layoff, could be insulated from at-
tack because of the operation of section 703(h). The most ex-
pansive reading of that section would shelter most job-related
decisions except hiring, since these could be linked somehow
to length of service. The first problem is whether the term
"bona fide seniority system" contemplates only agreements
between union and management or whether an employer-
initiated system relying on the length of service can also be
insulated by section 703(h).
Seniority is one of the classic issues of unionism and its
core usage connotes a collective bargaining agreement provid-
ing layoff by length of service, with the most senior employee
the last to be laid off. Further, the seniority cases treated by
the Supreme Court have all involved seniority provisions
agreed to by unions and management in collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, the first court to deal with the issue found that
an employer-initiated promotional system that relied on
length of service was a seniority system and therefore was in-
19801
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sulated by section 703(h). Finding nothing in the language of
703(h), its legislative intent or history that limited section
703(h)'s insulation of union-negotiated seniority provisions,
the court applied it to protect a plan unilaterally adopted by
the employer: "That a current employee expects to have cer-
tain seniority rights because of a plan adopted at the em-
ployer's initiative, as opposed to a plan negotiated between
labor and management in no way diminishes that employee's
expectations and it is those expectations which section 703(h)
was designed to protect.' 43
A second problem consists of the actual policies and prac-
tices that are protected by section 703(h). In Alexander v.
Machinists, Aero Lodge 375,4 4 a case involving a union-negoti-
ated collective bargaining agreement, the court allowed sec-
tion 703(h) to shelter a provision that actually violated or op-
erated as an override to the principal of seniority. While
seniority was generally measured by length of plant-wide ser-
vice, a unique "job equity" feature gave preference, whenever
there was a job vacancy, to an employee with prior experience
in that job. The employee with job equity was always pre-
ferred over employees without job equity, even over those
well-qualified to do the job and with longer plant-wide senior-
ity. Given the history of exclusion of minorities from the more
desirable jobs traditionally held by whites, the job equity
principle had a disparate impact on minority employees. Nev-
ertheless, the Sixth Circuit sheltered the'job equity provision
behind section 703(h):
With regard to the job equity features of the collective bar-
gaining agreements, it could be argued that they are not a
facet of the seniority system but a separate element affect-
ing job competition and hence not immune under § 703(h)
of the Act. The Act, however, speaks not simply of seniority
but of a bona fide seniority . . .system. A preference to
those with experience in a given occupation is in a sense lim-
ited occupational seniority and we see nothing in the statute
or in Teamsters to indicate that it shall stand on a different
footing than traditional plant-wide or departmental senior-
ity. It is a contractual provision neutral on its face and is, in
43. EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 445 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1978).
44. 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
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our view, an integral part of Avco's unique but nonetheless
bona fide seniority system.45
Beyond using job equity to stretch section 703(h) to en-
compass a contractual provision that is not itself a seniority
provision, the court in Alexander went further in expanding
the scope of section 703(h). The company had two divisions
operating in one plant, one making aircraft parts and the
other building furniture. Many of the most senior employees
in terms of company seniority were in the furniture division
because of constant fluctuations in employment in the aircraft
division. But early in 1971 the company phased out its furni-
ture division. None of the furniture employees were qualified
for aircraft jobs and, under the union contract, these furniture
workers were not entitled to be laid off when the furniture
division closed. Partially in response to pressure by the union,
the employer retrained the furniture employees to do the air-
craft job and hired them into it. The effect of this was to place
seventy-three white employees ahead of those who had accu-
mulated less than eleven years of seniority. Shortly thereafter
an earlier projected layoff in the aircraft division terminated
all regular assemblers, leaving only the former furniture divi-
sion employees who had been in the aircraft division only two
or three months. This layoff had a disparate impact on blacks
since none of the furniture division employees were black and
since forty-two percent of the laid off aircraft division assem-
blers were black. Despite the absence of any arguable basis in
a seniority system for protecting the decision to put these
white employees over black employees when a layoff was ex-
pected to eliminate the black employees' jobs, the Sixth Cir-
cuit found no violation.
We are loath to hold that the practice of a company and a
union of retraining its older employees so that they could
enjoy the benefit of continued employment is discriminatory
in nature simply because its implementation tends to ad-
versely affect the racial composition of the company.46
The notion that section 703(h) should insulate many on-
the-job issues from Title VII scrutiny may flow from the
45. Id. at 1378 (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 1381.
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rather cursory treatment given the facts by the Supreme
Court in Teamsters. There is, however, authority taking a
stricter view of what constitutes a seniority system. In Dicker-
son v. United States Steel Corp.,'7 the plaintiff challenged a
transfer provision in a labor contract that allowed the man-
agement to select the crews without regard to seniority when a
new facility opened. The court refused to dismiss the claim
that this agreement with the union had a disparate impact
and found that it was not sheltered by section 703(h). "The
plaintiff's second attack on the transfer policies at [the plant]
is the exemption of the new facilities from seniority require-
ments. Since this is an explicit exemption to the seniority sys-
tem it cannot be immunized by section 703(h).' In Parson v.
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp.,49 the Fifth Circuit ap-
peared to view the scope of a seniority system in a narrow
sense. In Parson, an employee that transferred from one de-
partment to another would be required to enter at the lowest
level job and remain there for ten days or until a higher level
job in the department opened. Blacks had in the past been
victims of discrimination, being assigned to the less paying
nonproduction departments. This ten-day bottom entry re-
quirement was part of the seniority provision of the collective
bargaining agreement; nonetheless, the court addressed its le-
gality by simply looking at the effect of the provision. While
the court did not explicitly hold so, it is apparent that the
court found this provision to be outside the scope of the se-
niority system protection of section 703(h).
Fisher v. Procter and Gamble Manufacturing Co.,50 was
another Fifth Circuit decision which seemed to view the se-
niority system protection as a narrow exemption. In Fisher,
the promotion system was based on a combination of skills
and work assessment, plus seniority. Seniority would be the
deciding factor between two generally equivalent applicants
for a transfer. It was also the practice to give the more senior
employee the job if his rating was "acceptable," even if the
less senior bidder was rated "strong" for the position. The
47. 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
48. Id. at 72.
49. 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978).
50. 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Court utilized a disparate impact test to analyze the legality
of the promotion system. Even though seniority played an im-
portant role in the promotion system, the court noted that
"[t]he existence of a bona fide seniority system, however, does
not shield the Company from 'other illegal acts, so long as
those are independently actionable.' "51
The collective bargaining provisions that were not pro-
tected by 703(h) in Parson and Fisher were part of the senior-
ity provisions, but were not directly related to the length of
service of the employee. The EEOC appears to support this
position which calls for a narrow interpretation of the employ-
ment practices that are protected by section 703(h).52 The test
proposed by these courts appears to be that a collective bar-
gaining provision, challenged because it operates with a dispa-
rate impact, will be insulated by section 703(h) only if its op-
eration is by length of service. Exceptions to the use of length
of service, while encompassed in the terms of a seniority pro-
vision of a collective bargaining agreement, will be subject to
attack under the general notions of disparate impact discrimi-
nation and not subject to the more difficult test established by
section 703(h).
More oblique, but perhaps more important, authority for a
narrow view of what types of employment decisions were shel-
tered by section 703(h) came from the Supreme Court itself.
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,53 a case decided after Team-
sters, the employer required pregnant employees to take a for-
mal leave of absence that carried with it the loss of all accu-
mulated seniority. An employee coming back from pregnancy
leave was essentially treated as a new employee since her old
job was not held open for her during the leave. Although the
Court concluded that the employer's "policy of denying accu-
mulated seniority to female employees returning from preg-
nancy leave violated section 703(a)(2) of Title VII,"'" the
opinion nowhere dealt with section 703(h). There were several
explanations other than inadvertence. First, the seniority pol-
icy and the leave of absence provision denying seniority to
51. Id. at 542.
52. Memorandum of the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, [1977] 2
EMPL. PRAc. GuIDE (CCH) 5029.
53. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
54. Id. at 139.
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pregnant employees were initiated by the employer and did
not involve a union negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ment. That explanation of Satty puts the DuPont decision in
doubt. A second interpretation of Satty is that the policy
challenged, the denial of accumulated seniority for pregnant
employees, does not turn on length of service. If this explana-
tion were correct the decision in Alexander was perhaps
wrong since the court sheltered behind section 703(h) the pro-
visions of a collective bargaining agreement concerning job eq-
uity even though it did not decide job questions on length of
service. Satty certainly put into jeopardy the broadest part of
Alexander, upholding an employer decision to transfer white
employees into a department where their presence will pro-
duce a layoff with a disparate impact on minority employees.
The questions presented by these divergent opinions were
addressed by the Supreme Court in a recent case. In Califor-
nia Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant55 the Supreme Court treated the
question of the definition of a seniority system. Plaintiff chal-
lenged a provision in a collective bargaining agreement which
required that an employee work at least 45 weeks in one cal-
endar year to attain permanent employee status. Not a single
black employee in the state's brewing industry had acquired
permanent employee status and thus the rule was challenged
under the disparate impact notion of discrimination. In fact,
the party that actually commenced the action had worked
with a brewery for five years, but had not acquired permanent
status. Defendant argued that rather than the Griggs dispa-
rate impact test, this employment practice was sheltered by
section 703(h) and the Teamsters test. The Ninth Circuit had
held that the 45-week requirement was not a component of a
seniority system since it did not turn on length of employee
service: employees could work up to 45 weeks each year for
many years without ever making favored permanent status
because the "45-week requirement [did] not involve an in-
crease in employment rights or benefits based upon the length
of the employee's accumulated service," the court applied the
effects doctrine to test the legality of the 45-week rule.56
55. 100 S. Ct. 814 (1980).
56. Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1978).
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The Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, reversed.5
The Court commenced its analysis by pointing out that Title
VII does not define seniority, and that the Court had "not
previously purported to delineate the contours of its mean-
ings."58 The Court chose three areas of inquiry to determine
the meaning of "seniority system." First, the Court would look
at the commonly accepted notions concerning seniority in in-
dustrial relations. Secondly, the Court would consider those
concepts in the context of Title VII, and thirdly, would con-
sider the national labor policy in regard to seniority.5 9
In labor relations, the Court found, "seniority is a term
that connotes length of employment. A 'seniority system' is a
scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-seniority criteria,
allots to employees ever improving employment rights and
benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment in-
creases."60 The basic feature of all seniority systems "is that
preferential treatment is dispensed on the basis of some mea-
sure of time served in employment." 1 With these basic no-
tions of seniority as a background, the Court reviewed senior-
ity within the context of Title VII and national labor policy.
Emphasizing that Congress had utilized the word "sys-
tems" in formulating 703(h), the Court found that:
Congress in 1964 quite evidently intended to exempt from
the normal operation of Title VII more than simply those
components of any particular seniority scheme that, viewed
in isolation embody or effectuate the principle that length of
employment will be rewarded. In order for any seniority sys-
tem to operate at all, it has to contain ancillary rules that
accomplish certain necessary functions, but which may not
themselves be directly related to length of employment.62
After providing a list of such "ancillary rules," the Court
noted that, long-standing labor policy provided that collective
bargaining should be the means of establishing conditions of
57. Justices Powell and Stevens took no part in the case; Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Blackmun dissented.
58. 100 S. Ct. at 819.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 820.
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employment.63
While recognizing that 703(h) would protect "seniority
systems" and their "ancillary rules,"" the Court was quick to
point out that 703(h) is not to be given "a scope that risks
swallowing up Title VII's otherwise broad prohibition of
'practices, procedures, and tests' that disproportionately affect
members of those groups that the Act protects. ' 65 While free-
dom should be provided to employers and employees in devel-
oping seniority systems, "that freedom must not be allowed to
sweep within the ambit of 703(h) employment rules that de-
part fundamentally from commonly accepted notions concern-
ing the acceptable contours of a seniority system....
In applying the above mentioned rules to the case at hand,
the Court found the 45-week rule was a proper means of es-
tablishing a threshold requirement for entry into the perma-
nent employee seniority track. The temporary and permanent
employee status were seen as two distinct seniority tracks.
The Court noted that between temporary employees, those
with the most seniority received preference in terms of layoffs
and bumping rights, so that a seniority track existed that con-
sisted of temporary employees. This two track seniority sys-
tem was compared to the two track seniority system in Team-
sters and found to be similar in nature.
The test that the Court proposes seems to be a historical
one. The historical or industrial custom approach seems in-
herently unsatisfactory. While employment tests or educa-
tional prerequisites have not so far been common as thresh-
olds to seniority systems, there may well be pressure in future
collective bargaining to include them in seniority provisions.
How will the courts be able to determine what is the appropri-
ate bargaining history or industry custom when the process of
collective bargaining is so fluid? While the Court treated ap-
plication of its rule to the instant case as straightforward, that
may not be so easy in other circumstances. The majority ar-
gues that the more senior temporary employees are more
likely to satisfy the 45-week requirement. But the dissent by
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 820-21.
66. Id. at 821.
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Justice Marshall points out that the requirement is subject to
manipulation. Unlike seniority generally, the 45-week rule is
very unpredictable.
Indeed, cumulative length of service is only incidentally
relevant to the 45 week rule. The likelihood that a tempo-
rary employee will attain permanent employee status Is
largely unpredictable. The 45 week period.... represents
almost 90 percent of the calendar year. Even if an employee
is relatively senior among temporaries, his ability to work 45
weeks in a year will rest a large part on fortuities over which
he has no control. The most obvious reason that employees
have been prevented from attaining permanent employee
status - a reason barely referred to by the Court - is that
the brewing industry is a seasonal one.67
In sum, the decision in California Brewers adopts a middle
ground position as to what is sheltered by section 703(h)s
definition of a seniority system. Such traditional seniority re-
lated questions as to the separate tracks of seniority in de-
partmental or job classification systems will be sheltered. In
contrast, test or educational requirements will not be shel-
tered. Section 703(h) should shelter only a provision of a col-
lective bargaining agreement which turns on length of service.
Using section 703(h) to create a broader shield for on-the-job
policies and practices would exceed its purpose, which is to
accommodate seniority agreements (that safeguard employee
expectations of protection from layoff that increase with
length of service) with the obligation to provide equal employ-
ment opportunity. The California Brewers decision will obvi-
ously trigger continued litigation over the issue of what is
sheltered by the term seniority system, since the decision fails
to establish any clear-cut test. More litigation is likely because
of the importance of the issue.
Once it has been decided what types of employment poli-
cies and practices are sheltered by section 703(h), the second
question is what the standard should be when 703(h) seniority
systems are challenged and how that standard should be ap-
plied. In James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co., 8 the court
described the Teamsters standard for deciding whether a se-
67. Id. at 824.
68. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
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niority system was bona fide as involving "four factors."
1. Whether the seniority system operates to discourage all
employees equally from transferring between seniority units;
2. Whether the seniority units are in the same or separate
bargaining units (if the latter, whether that structure is ra-
tional and in conformance with industry practice);
3. Whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial
discrimination; and
4. Whether the system was negotiated and has been main-
tained free from any illegal purpose.09
In sum, the Fifth Circuit characterized the inquiry as fact
laden - "the facts of a particular seniority unit are critical"
- and distinguished Teamsters as a case where
the plaintiffs conceded that the seniority system did not
have its genesis in racial discrimination and that it was ne-
gotiated and maintained free from any illegal purpose.
There is no such concession here. The seniority system at
Stockham was adopted in a collective bargaining agreement
in 1949, when segregation in the South was standard operat-
ing procedure .... [On remand the] district court should
give careful consideration to the negotiations involving the
seniority system at Stockham and to the employment prac-
tices underlying such negotiations."
The Fifth Circuit has thus endorsed an approach that is
realistic in testing the bona fide nature of a seniority system.
Taking a similar realistic approach, the district court in Chra-
pliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc.7 1 struck down a seniority system find-
ing that the system was not bona -fide. Citing evidence that
before passage of Title VII the defendants kept gender segre-
gated seniority lists and that after passage the formal lists
were changed to "A" and "B" lists which were "only a dis-
guise to the former segregated system," the court found that
"the employment system at Uniroyal has had as its genesis
discriminatory conduct both before and after the passage of
the Act." 2
The Teamsters standard focuses on the intent or purpose
69. Id. at 352.
70. Id. at 352-53.
71. 15 FAiR EMPL. PRAc. CA . 822 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
72. Id. at 826.
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to discriminate associated with the creation or operation of a
seniority system.73 The James decision provided a useful test
to show the bona fide nature of a seniority system. The bur-
den imposed on the plaintiff is not impossible, but it still in-
volves a strong showing of purposeful discrimination. The Su-
preme Court has faced the issue of proving intentional
discrimination in a number of cases. Washington v. Davis7 4
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.7 5 have
been two of the most recent pronouncements on this issue.
From these cases some general guidelines may be extracted
that are helpful to understand the necessary proof in chal-
lenges to seniority systems. First of all, the Court considers
disproportionate impact to be relevant to a finding of discrim-
inatory intent. In fact, Justice Stevens, in his concurring opin-
ion in Washington found objective evidence, such as -tatistics,
to frequently be the most probative evidence of discrimina-
tory intent.7 8 Secondly, the challenged action does not have to
be the result of solely discriminatory purposes. Justice Powell
in Arlington recognizes that very seldom is a single concern
the basis of a particular discriminatory action." The "subjects
of inquiry" proposed by the Court in Arlington to determine
discriminatory intent included: 1) historical background; 2)
the specific sequence of events leading up to the action; 3) any
departures from normal procedures followed by the decision-
maker; 4) any documented evidence of discriminatory intent
or purpose. These guidelines have been basically incorporated
in the James factors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has provided answers to a number of
seniority-related Title VII issues. The "present effects" or
"disparate impact" tests are no longer viable means of chal-
lenging the creation or operation of seniority systems. Plain-
tiffs are now required to show a purpose or intent to discrimi-
nate in the formulation or operation of a seniority system. It
is now necessary to see if the tests adopted by the courts to
73. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
75. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
76. 426 U.S. at 253.
77. 429 U.S. at 265.
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determine discriminatory intent will be realistic and practical
as proposed by the James court.
Seniority may be granted to a victim of discrimination as
part of a court-ordered remedy. The granting of seniority as
part of a court-ordered remedy is in line with the "make
whole" policy of Title VII.
The Supreme Court has attempted to provide a definition
for "seniority." The approach taken by the Court is one that
stresses historical practice and industry custom. The defini-
tion is a broad one which will require further litigation in or-
der to determine its actual limits.
The use of seniority is prevalent throughout American in-
dustrial relations. There is no reason to believe that its pres-
ence will diminish significantly. The lower courts will now be
handed the responsibility of properly applying the guidelines
set out by the Supreme Court. Further statements by the
Supreme Court will be needed to address developing issues in
the seniority area.
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